

# THE DINAMICS ON CITIZENSHIP – A THEORETICAL APPROACH

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## Abstract

*In this paper I argue that the concept of citizenship is fundamentally a dynamic concept, a reflection of the society in which we live in. Thus, I identify participation as the main element of this dynamics. Starting from a simple definition – citizenship as the connecting point between individuals and the state through rights and obligations – I note that citizenship is called upon on one hand in order to legitimate a political community's authority, and on the other hand, in order to protect the individuals through guaranteeing a set of civil, political and social rights. In order to fulfill these functions, the institution of citizenship must permit a continuous negotiation and re-negotiation of the social contract, in a well-defined framework (in terms of time and place coordinates). Thus a particular mechanism emerges, transcending the classical theoretical approaches meant to explain who, how, for whom and why we discuss the issue of citizenship. My paper follows a three-step argument: first, I will start by deconstructing the concept of citizenship to its component elements, stressing out those aspects I consider to be relevant in terms of dynamics. Secondly, I will look at the main theoretical approaches regarding citizenship, considered as the results of a modeling process which establishes particular relations between various elements composing a system. Finally, I will underline the importance of participation (active or/and passive) in the process of (re-)constructing the concept of citizenship. Also, in this last part, I will try to synthesize the main elements that contribute to the dynamics of citizenship.*

**Keywords:** *citizenship, theories of citizenship, active participation, passive participation, dynamics.*

## Introduction

The main thesis of my paper is that citizenship is essentially a dynamic concept, fundamentally depending on the context within it functions. Thus I argue that one of the core elements composing this dynamics is participation which, in relation with citizenship, develops at least two dimensions: *active participation* – implying effective and sustained implication of individuals and groups in the governing processes affecting their lives, and *passive participation*, which implies that the lack of action is a form of response or an implicit evaluation of the social contract at one given moment, thus a form of agreeing on the status quo.

Studying the dynamics of citizenship has in my view at least two major implications: first, it makes available the proper analytical tools with which one can understand the historical changes of the concept, and secondly, it may provide researchers with the ability to forecast future directions in which the concept may change and evolve.

Thus, in this paper I want to reveal the flexible points or aspects present in the concept of citizenship that can reveal its dynamic nature. I consider such an approach as necessary due to the

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fact that up until now, the relevant literature concerned with the concept of citizenship developed an integrated model of the concept's inner dynamics, therefore this essential aspect being taken into consideration only as a secondary element or as part of a wider context, but never as a core dimension of the concept.

On account of clarity, I find it necessary to draw up a first subchapter in order to ensure a clear definition of the concepts I will relate to and make use of along this paper, starting with citizenship and proceeding onwards with the concepts resulting from its deconstruction. At the same time, at this stage, my purpose would be to provide an analytical approach to the discussed concepts by a permanent reference to the core of this paper, namely citizenship as a fundamentally dynamic notion. The concepts that will be discussed hereafter are: citizenship, individual, political community, relationship, rights, obligations, participation.

### *What does citizenship stand for?*

Inin and Turner define citizenship as a legal status held under the authority of a state<sup>2</sup>, a social process by means of which individuals and groups undertake to follow their interests by shaping obligations and rights<sup>3</sup>. Stressing the participative dimension of citizenship, Richard Bellamy refers to it as a particular set of political practices involving specific rights and obligations with respect to a political community.<sup>4</sup>

Other scholars emphasize the membership status entailed by citizenship and the relation between individual identities and the citizenship building process. For example, Thomas Janoski and Brian Gran approach citizenship from the membership standpoint, be it passive or aggressive, by the individuals to a nation-state that guarantees them universal rights and obligations on a certain level of equality<sup>5</sup>, a process in which each person sees the relation between rights and obligations as an exchange and a swing by which the self develops in relation to the state and to a manifold of political groups<sup>6</sup>. Faulks stresses the importance of citizenship as mediating factor in the relationship between the civil society and the state and the fact that the citizens' understanding of how they are to exercise their rights and obligations is crucial to the soundness and stability of any system of government<sup>7</sup>.

We can see therefore that the definitions of citizenship are manifold, with certain elements however remaining constant, namely the *relation* between individuals and a *political community* embodied in a set of *rights* and *obligations*, elements that will be discussed in what follows.

### *What is the individual or to what sort of individuals do we refer to when taking radiography of the dynamics of citizenship?*

In the existing literature on the matter, a distinction is set between two different approaches to the concept of individual, approaches which are complementary in my perspective, namely the bio-sociological<sup>8</sup>, emphasizing the social and/or biological determinism and the philosophical-

<sup>2</sup> Inin, Engin F. și Turner Bryan S. "Citizenship Studies. An introduction", in Inin, Engin F. și Turner Bryan S., *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, (Londra: Sage Publication 2002), p. 2;

<sup>3</sup> Idem 2, p. 4;

<sup>4</sup> Bellamy, Richard. *What is Citizenship. A Very Short Introduction*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 3;

<sup>5</sup> Janoski, Thomas și Gran, Brian. "Political Citizenship: Foundation for Rights", in Inin, Engin F. și Turner Bryan S., ed., *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, (Londra: Sage Publication 2002), p. 13;

<sup>6</sup> Idem 6, p. 14;

<sup>7</sup> Faulks, Keith. *Political Sociology. A introduction*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 126;

<sup>8</sup> See Budon, Raimond, coord., *Tratat de sociologie(Treatise of Sociology)*, (București: Humanitas, 1997), p. 251);

political<sup>9</sup> approach, grounded on a conception regarding human condition. Reality, or better said the perception of reality, is generated by the manner in which the manifold of the aspects related to biology, sociology and political philosophy configures itself, thereby engendering a model of the individual, or representing an Weberian ideal type. At the same time, one could easily guess that there is no single equilibrium point leading to the stabilization of the model, therefore that we are dealing with multiple equilibrium states intensified by the context in which the calibration of the model takes place<sup>10</sup>. The perspective that places the individual at the intersection between the philosophical-political approach and the bio-sociological one could prove very useful in providing answers with regard to the scope of the concept of citizenship, i.e. with regard to *who* and *why* should or shouldn't be citizen.

***What does a political community stand for or what do we bear in mind when we speak of a political community with regard to citizenship?***

Max Weber characterizes political structures depending on the source of the legitimacy, territoriality, available means of coercion and degree of institutionalization of the authority system<sup>11</sup>. Setting out from the assumption that power is part of any society and not just a mere derivative of economical domination and that, besides administration, it also involves governing people, power becomes as such a basic element for the construction of a political society<sup>12</sup>. The manner in which the aforementioned elements combine and/or merge has a fundamental impact on the nature of the political community we refer to at any give moment.

The authors concerned with this issue especially refer to certain political communities when approaching the problem of citizenship, mainly discussing the ancient and the modern citizenships with respect to the specific organization of the fortress cities of Ancient Greece and Roman Empire<sup>13</sup>, respectively the city-state<sup>14</sup>, as within these communities first takes place the

<sup>9</sup> In this case we operate with four fundamental perspectives on human nature: the **optimistic view**- mainly related to the liberal ideology and according to which humans have an intrinsic value deriving from their being reason-endowed (Țăranu, Andrei. *Doctrină politică moderne și contemporane (Modern and Contemporary Political Doctrines)*, (București: Fundației Pro, 2005), p. 17); the **pessimistic view**- mostly assumed by the conservative perspective, setting out from the assumption that the human being lacks a general inclination towards altruism, being more of an egoistic being, bound rather for idleness and acting only by virtue of self-interest, according to this approach individual rationality being profoundly marked by emotions (Socaciu, Mihail, coord., *Filosofia politică a lui Thomas Hobbes (Thomas Hobbes Political Philosophy)*, (Iași: Polirom, 2001), p. 37-38); the **rationalist view**- formulated by Grotius according to whom the innate sociability of human being represents its essential characteristic, adding up to the fact that everybody rigorously respects the promises and conventions they pledged themselves to (Turchetti, Mario. *Tirania și tiranicidul. Forme ale opresiunii și dreptul la rezistență din antichitate până în zilele noastre (Tyranny and Tyrannicide. Forms of Oppression and the Right Resistance from Antiquity to Present)*, (București: Cartier, 2003), pp. 615-618); the **Marxist view**- Marx's deterministic historic-materialistic approach also shapes its view of human nature- the existence determines consciousness.

<sup>10</sup> Two such equilibrium states are elaborated in Locke's and Rousseau's theories of natural and civil right.

<sup>11</sup> Weber, Max, *Politica, o vocație și o profesie*, (Bucharest: Anima, 1992), p. 8;

<sup>12</sup> Chazel, Francois, *Puterea (Power)*, in Budon, Raimond, coordinator, *Tratat de sociologie (Treatise of Sociology)*, (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1997, p. 248;

<sup>13</sup> The perspective on the organization of the *polis* was a pure utopia, the reality of the political life being completely different. The fact that the basis for its construction was represented by a small number of citizens, that should have had sufficient common interests, further enforced directly by participating in the decision making resulted in the fact that Greek citizenship was rather exclusive than inclusive. As such, women and long term residents enjoyed only partially the civil rights, while slaves were denied the citizenship. Another source of exclusion resulted from the fact that freedom and equality were profoundly bound to the membership to the polis, more precisely to land ownership. See Dahl, Robert A. *Democrația și criticii ei (Democracy and its Critics)*, (Bucharest: Institutul European, 2002), pp. 31-32;

<sup>14</sup> See Schulze, Hagen, *Stat și națiune în istoria Europei (State, Nations and Nationalism: from the Middle Ages to the Present)*, (Iași: Polirom, 2003), chap.1, 2;

coming of the individuals in the political sphere, identified and specified as such and having as fundament the equality of the citizens as members of a political community, which is a result of the replacement of the hierarchical and dominance relationships with reciprocity ones<sup>15</sup>.

In this context the gained legitimacy becomes very important, but it “must be constantly maintained and renewed by the legitimizing process [...] the mixed character of the political power is bestowed by this joint and not necessarily harmonious dynamics”<sup>16</sup>. As such, we are dealing here with a political arrangement that stabilizes itself by its very capacity of continuously adapting to the needs of the governed.

### ***What does a relation consist of and what kind of relation does citizenship entail?***

By its simplest definition, a relationship is a link, a connection between things, ideas, facts, processes, terms etc. In the corresponding literature, the relation between individuals and the political communities they belong to is defined as an inclusion relationship that, with respect to the view of the individuals and of who must or deserves to be a citizen, and to territoriality<sup>17</sup> as well, automatically entails an exclusive dimension. The inclusion relationship entailed by citizenship is one of order, even of complete order<sup>18</sup> as citizens are considered to be equal with respect to their rights and duties, therefore comparable in this respect. As such, the assumption by which we proceed is that given the class of the individuals, one of its subclasses is represented by the included individuals and the other by the excluded ones. In the next step of the analysis, the inclusion criteria become important, assuming that citizenship is desirable. Further, the desirability of citizenship as against the inclusion relationship it entails, involves the fact that the inclusion relation has value, value that I personally find mainly instrumental, therefore extrinsic<sup>19</sup>, in nature, as long as the citizen status represents both the basis for the guarantee of the civil rights and for the enforcement of the obligations, desirability that entails a permanent process of forcing the *boundaries* of citizenship, therefore dynamic in nature.

## **Citizenship: rights and obligations**

Citizenship is also seen as “the right to have rights”<sup>20</sup>, namely that certain something that conditions the access to certain rights upon the belonging to a political community. In the specialized literature we basically find two approaches to the citizen’s rights, the first from the standpoint of the functions of the rights, the second from that of their scope. With regard to their corresponding validity domain, and we are mainly speaking here of *legal or civil rights* (personal

<sup>15</sup> Bachelier, Christian, *Ce este cetățenia?, (What is Citizenship?)*, (Iași: Polirom, 2001), p. 7;

<sup>16</sup> Bachelier, Christian, *Ce este cetățenia?, (What is Citizenship?)*, (Iași: Polirom, 2001), p. 7;

<sup>17</sup> Reality still compels us to refer to city states, even if in the specialized literature there are ample elaborations of the theories concerning cosmopolitan citizenship.

<sup>18</sup> An order relationship in which any two given elements are comparable bears the name of *total order relationship*.

<sup>19</sup> One could also find arguments for an intrinsic value of citizenship to the extent that, for example, in a world of citizens one could want to be a citizen just for the sake of being released of any ulterior benefits and obligations, citizenship thereby gaining intrinsic value. However, I personally find this aspect to be of lesser importance in the analysis I set forth, as I believe it can be subsumed to the multitude of possible arrangements in the configuration of the individual and, as such, the effects of the swing on this dimension are to be felt in the dynamics of the citizenship irrespective of its being included in the characterization of either the relation, or the individuals.

<sup>20</sup> Bellamy, Richard. *What is Citizenship. A Very Short Introduction*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 15;

security, access to justice, consciousness and choice), *political rights* (personal political, organizational, membership rights), *social rights* (empowering rights, opportunity development rights, redistribution and compensation rights) and *participation rights* (labor market rights, consultative or determinative rights mostly referring to rights resulting from collective negotiation and co-determination rights, capital control rights). From the standpoint of their *validity domain* we can speak of *universal rights* (involving all citizens found in the capacity to make use of them) and of *particular rights* (applicable to a small body of citizens by virtue of some specific differences separating the respective group from the mass of the citizens)<sup>21</sup>.

Just as in the case of the rights, the discussion regarding the obligations involved with citizenship depends on the manner in which the different approaches to the individuals and the political communities, configure around the inclusion relation, thereby together modeling the substance of citizenship in different theoretical configurations. It is certain however that irrespective of the theoretical approach, the obligations mainly involve the submission to and equality of the citizens with respect to the law, law which is devised in such a manner as to satisfy the needs of the citizens at a given time. Obligations, just as rights, are shaped along a continuous process of adaptation to reality, process that provides the substance of the political construction within which these are undertaken by the citizens, thereby legitimating the government.

## Five basic theories of citizenship

Essentially, in the presentation of the five basic theories, I will attempt at providing an analysis of the manner in which the elements I have presented in the previous pages, come together in the form a unitary explicative vision of citizenship, more to the point, of the manner in which a certain vision on human nature, political edification, the nature and the role of the relationship between individuals and political community is embodied in rights and obligations that, in their turn, become apparent in the institutionalization of the state by the citizen. The multitude of the existing theories<sup>22</sup>, is proof to the diversity of the answers that can be given to this question and to the intense current debates, enlivening the scholarly field concerned with citizenship. They will be presented hereafter.

**The liberal theory of citizenship.** The edification of the liberal citizenship<sup>23</sup> sets out from the individuals, as they are the ones who, by association, set up all the other constructions pertaining to citizenship. The placement of the individual before everything else is grounded on an optimistic view with respect to human nature, namely by virtue of the rationality bestowed upon equal and free individuals. Thereby they are the most qualified to administrate their own lives, the aims of which limit themselves to the optimal satisfaction of the personal interests<sup>24</sup>. The development of the conception of the individual has obvious effects upon shaping the criteria for the right government. Therefore, what we are dealing here with is a relativization of the *best*

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<sup>21</sup> See Janoski, Thomas and Grant, Brian “ Political Citizenship: Foundation for Rights”, in Isin, Engin F. and Turner Bryan S., ed., *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, London: Sage Publication 2002; Janoski, Thomas, *Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rihts and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional and Social Democratic Regimes*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 28 - 35;

<sup>22</sup> See Beiner, Ronald, *Theorizing Citizenship*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), Introduction;

<sup>23</sup> The liberal doctrine knows nuance differences that became apparent in the distinction between classical, social and neoclassical liberalism; the same assumptions however are subjacent to each of them. For further details see Țăranu, Andrei. *Doctrină politică modernă și contemporană (Modern and Contemporary Political Doctrines)*, (București: Fundației Pro, 2005), pp. 23 – 30;

<sup>24</sup> Țăranu, Andrei. *Doctrină politică modernă și contemporană (Modern and Contemporary Political Doctrines)*, (București: Fundației Pro, 2005), pp. 17 – 18;

government, as the latter is permanently being set against the interests of the individuals, interests that, in the extent in which they can be satisfied by the market, by the regulation of the invisible hand, involve the maximum possible reduction of the state's attributions by virtue of its incapacity to properly estimate the nature of a government just by the legitimacy bestowed upon it<sup>25</sup>.

Setting out from this basis, liberal citizenship can be defined as that distinct view on citizenship having as main finality the maximization of the citizens' individual freedom<sup>26</sup>. In such a structure, the individuals act in keeping with the rights being guaranteed by the political community, by their own beliefs and values. They are free to choose whether and how they participate, civically or politically, in what sort of market transactions they partake, thereby also assuming the effects of the choices they make. The individual rights are universal and precede both the obligations and the state, but at the same time, the liberal citizens are tolerant with respect to the obligations deriving from the necessity of respecting the rights of the others. Collective rights are secondary to the individuals and are not attributed to some abstract entities. The state must provide for a climate in which the citizens can enjoy equal opportunity, climate that is best generated by mainly ensuring the civil and political rights. By providing civil and political equality by virtue of the rationality of the citizens, the liberal citizenship tolerates inequality in wealth and income gained from the performance on the market, fact leading to an incompatibility with the redistributive policies.

**The communitarian theory of citizenship.** An alternative to the liberal view on the citizenship is provided by the communitarian theories<sup>27</sup>. The ground pillar around which the communitarian citizenship is constructed is the community<sup>28</sup>, which is considered to precede the political order and the state.

With regard to human nature, the communitarians claim<sup>29</sup> that there is no immutable reference system and that it would be more pertinent to speak of a dynamic, gradually developing human nature. As such, according to this view, we do not get born humans, but become as such. Setting out from this assumption, the communitarians, totally opposed to the conservatives, believe that individuals, in the extent that they are being embedded in a favorable, moral environment, which is rich in values, develop ever more virtuously. Socialization, namely *right socialization*, becomes essential and along with it, the socialization environments become the focal point of the communitarian approach. Family, school, community and communities of communities are the basic moral infrastructure for the shaping of the individuals.

<sup>25</sup> The aim of the liberal conception on the role of the state is to avoid the risks entailed by the fact that the relation between the individuals and the political community in which they act is regulated by the legitimacy that covers only the good part of the government, the bad part thereby eluding control. Therefore, according to the liberal conception, as long as there is an alternative formula guaranteeing the promotion of the interests of the individuals, namely the market, the role of the government can be limited, thereby also minimizing the risks of the emergence of illegitimate governmental actions.

<sup>26</sup> Suck, Peter. H., "Liberal citizenship", in Isin, Engin F. and Turner Bryan S., ed., *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, (Londra: Sage Publication 2002), p. 132

<sup>27</sup> "The main foe of communitarians is liberalism. This adversity is not gregarious in nature, of in corpore rejection of the liberal ideas, it is a process of dynamical borrowing of concepts and of relocating them in a new space- the social space". (Țăranu, Andrei. *Comunitarismul – doctrină contemporană. O filosofie a binelui comun – Communitarianism – a Contemporary Doctrine. O Philosophy of the Common Good-* (Chișinău: Arc, 2005), p. 33);

<sup>28</sup> "The community therefore becomes a group of persons tied together by specific interests in a social group, characterized by a specific structure and culture, resulting from the relationships and psychosocial processes within. Țăranu, Andrei *Comunitarismul – doctrină contemporană. O filosofie a binelui comun – Communitarianism- a Contemporary Doctrine. O Philosophy of the Common Good*, (Chișinău: Arc, 2005), p.11);

<sup>29</sup> Several nuance positions emerged within the communitarian perspective- communitarians, civil republicanism, liberal communitarians. These differences do not concern this study, that attempts at providing a general perspective on the communitarian theory with respect to the elements that are related to citizenship.

Regarding the political community, the state, the communitarians claim that we should dispense with the idea that the state should be neutral, backing the conception that the state should be involved in the life of the community, in the production of the common good, by its capacity to impose certain limitations on self-determination, “which are necessary for preserving the social conditions capable of generating and strengthening self-determination”<sup>30</sup>.

According to this approach, citizenship emerges within a community characterized by a specific cultural dimension, thereby stressing the social dimension of the rights and obligations. For the communitarians, citizenship involves the participation to the political life of the community, while, at the same time, accounting for a way to preserve its identity, thereby representing, in one way or another, a challenge to the universalism of the liberal citizenship that, from this standpoint, becomes rather problematic with respect to the integration of a set of very different identities.<sup>31</sup> Mindful of the differences, the communitarians support the equal dignity of the citizens and find that the majority should make concessions in favor of the minorities and, very important, claim that the state should grant them formal recognition.

**The republican theory of citizenship.** The republican tradition, according to Dahl, sets out from the assumption that the human being is, by its very nature, a social and political being that must cohabitate within a political association. “[...] a good man must be a good citizen; a good political organization is an association made up of good citizens; a good citizen is one endowed with the quality of civic virtue; virtue is the predisposition to seek everybody’s wellbeing with respect to public issues; therefore, a good political organization is one that not only reflects, but also promotes the virtue of its citizens”<sup>32</sup>. Therefore, the republicans emphasize in great extent the *civic virtue*, but at the same time they stress the fact that it is not immutable, but, au contraire, a people or its leaders can become corrupt, the greatest danger being represented by the emergence of certain political factions promoting a state of conflict within the republic<sup>33</sup>.

The republican citizenship is set somewhere between the liberal and the communitarian one, attempting at finding a balance between rights and obligations, individual and community, by promoting both cooperation and competition. The republicans find that the best instrument for promoting this balance is the participation, be it civic, political or on the market, criticizing liberal theories for their over-stressing of privacy, individual rights and underrating of the promotion of the civic virtues, which can lead citizens to a better performance of their duties.

Another important aspect of the republican citizenship regards its legal status. The republican tradition sees freedom as a product of the laws generated by the citizens through participation, unlike liberals who claim that laws are a necessary evil the function of which would be to preserve that much freedom for the individuals as to enable them to live together<sup>34</sup>. Therefore, while liberals emphasize individual autonomy, the republicans support the cohesion of the community, which governs itself on the basis of the legality resulted from the participation of the citizens in the very laws they are subject to<sup>35</sup>.

In nuce, republican citizenship seeks to become a *via media* between the communitarian and the liberal approaches, by the fact that: both individuals and communities are important and

<sup>30</sup> Țăranu, Andrei. *Comunitarismul – doctrină contemporană. O filosofie a binelui comun – Communitarianism-a Contemporary Doctrine. O Philosophy of the Common Good-*, (Chișinău: Arc, 2005), p. 109;

<sup>31</sup> Delanty, Gerard. „Comunitarism and Citizenship”, în Isin, Engin F. and Turner Bryan S., ed., *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, (London: Sage Publication 2002), pp. 159 – 175;

<sup>32</sup> Dahl, Robert A, *Democrația și critică ei, (Democracy and its critics)*, (Bucharest: Institutul European, 2002), p. 39;

<sup>33</sup> Idem 32;

<sup>34</sup> Bellamy, Richard. *What is Citizenship. A Very Short Introduction*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 43;

<sup>35</sup> Ciprut, Jose V., *Citizenship: Mere Contract, or Construct for Conduct?*, in Ciprut, Jose V., ed., *The Future of Citizenship*, (London: The MIT Press, 2008), p. 11;

therefore participation represents the best way to consensus; groups must respect the rights of the individuals, which, being underrepresented, must form groups so that their interests can find representation, as groups have a higher negotiation capacity; there is a complex balance between rights and obligations, between the universal and the particular, that is being generated through the rule of law; the institutions resulting from such an interaction between the individuals and the political community create the necessary spaces for the citizens to actively participate in the decision making.

**Cosmopolitan citizenship, multicultural citizenship.** In the end of this section, I find it necessary to draw up a short presentation of two approaches that are often considered to be antithetical and that become ever more apparent within the field of citizenship, namely the cosmopolitan and the multicultural approaches<sup>36</sup>.

*Cosmopolitan citizenship* originates with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant who, being strongly influenced by the Cartesian philosophy, by the logic according to which there is a certain *a priori*, an undeniable essence, set the basis for a universal system of ethics having as fundament the aforementioned “essence”, namely the very capacity as human being, especially by postulating the categorical imperative- *Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law!*, respectively *Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means to an end!*<sup>37</sup> This universal ethics is guided by a principle according to which any human being must be treated humanely, that is according to an inalienable dignity that becomes in turn a global attachment to a culture of non-violence and respect for life, to a just economic order, to tolerance, to a life guided by truth and, last but not least, to the principle of equal rights<sup>38</sup>. In the definition of citizenship, Alejandro Colas makes use of the following three principles: 1. all individuals are members to a single moral community by virtue of their humanity; 2. as such, they are morally bound to each other and these obligations transcend the boundaries of ethnicity, nationality or of any other particular definition of identity and 3. these obligations require political involvement with respect to their being put into practice<sup>39</sup>.

The cosmopolitan approach to citizenship is most often criticized for the alleged fact that it imposes a rather utopian view of citizenship instead of a pragmatic one, namely one that could be actually embodied in exercisable rights and obligations. Assuming some of these criticisms, the theoreticians of the cosmopolitan citizenship continue to challenge the traditional approaches that restrict citizenship to the nation-state, emphasizing the fact that individuals are members to the international society and subjects to international law<sup>40</sup>.

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<sup>36</sup> In the literature one could also find references to other approaches to citizenship, such as sexual citizenship, cultural citizenship, and ecological citizenship. However, I have found it more important to draw up a presentation of the cosmopolitan and of the multicultural citizenships with respect to the manner in which the redefinition of the relationship between individuals and the political community they belong to, takes place, namely by challenging the nation-state as sole political entity for the citizenship to develop in (the cosmopolitan approach) and by stressing the importance of the processes by which the identity of the citizens is built (the multicultural approach).

<sup>37</sup> Kant, Immanuel; trans. Ellington J.W. [1785] (1993), p. 36;

<sup>38</sup> Dallymar, Fred. Cosmopolitanism. Moral and Political, *Political Theory*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Jun., 2003), pp. 421-442, p 6;

<sup>39</sup> Robinson, Fioana Cosmopolitan Ethics and Feminism in Global Politics, *All Academic Research*, accesat pe [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/0/7/4/3/8/pages74386/p74386-1.php](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/4/3/8/pages74386/p74386-1.php)

<sup>40</sup> An important step to the consolidation of the cosmopolitan citizenship is represented by the *Nürnberg Chart* giving army men the right to refuse compliance with the orders of the superiors if these lead to crime against humanity. At the same time, the CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF GENOCIDE (1948), the CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT (1984), the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1948), THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1966)



*Multicultural citizenship.* The theoreticians of multicultural citizenship claim not only that universal citizenship and its classical, nation-state bound, form are unrealistic alternatives, but that these forms of citizenship are *a priori* undesirable. As such, setting out from the assumption that any society is essentially multicultural, made up of a manifold of populations of different religions, genders, social environments or ethnicities, citizenship should provide a favorable space for the management of these differences so as to guarantee, in equal measure, the identity development of all the citizens. Multiculturalists claim that the rights of the minorities cannot be subsumed to the human rights as the international standards to which the latter are subject to, cannot provide answers to questions such as: What language should there be used in administration? Should any ethnic group receive financing for native language education? Should the inner boundaries of states be drawn in such a manner as to insure, within them, the majority of the various ethnic groups? Should governmental authority be decentralized? Should attributions be imparted in proportion to the ethnical diversity within the respective state? Should minorities become integrated? Is it their responsibility to do so? etc.<sup>41</sup>. Therefore, common civil rights, originally devised by and for the white christian male, cannot cope with the specific needs of other groups, while an integrative citizenship must take into account these differences<sup>42</sup>.

Kymlicka separates between three types of group rights bound with differentiated citizenship: a) the special representation rights within representative political institutions; b) self-government rights (the right of the respective minorities to decide with respect to the aspects of the utmost importance for the respective community- such as education, language, family etc.), c) multiethnic rights (the protection of the specific religious and cultural practices of the community in question, protection that isn't provided by the existing legislation)<sup>43</sup>

In nuce, the grounding framework for the multicultural citizenship would reside in the following claims: the complex identities of the individuals must be reflected by civil rights and obligations; the groups identified by ethno-cultural characteristics may benefit from collective rights; universal rights are not sufficient, as they cover only part of the needs of the individuals in an anifold society; citizens build their identities within groups with the help of group rights, so they may and must militate for gaining them.

***Citizenship and participation.*** Modern citizenship is necessarily grounded on democratic principles<sup>44</sup>. Irrespective of the citizens' actually participating or not in the decision making process, the very fact that they can do it, fundamentally changes their position within the respective political community and the manner in which individuals shape themselves and their political identity. The existence of the mechanisms which are necessary to make participation to

constitute important steps in defining cosmopolitan rights. Another very important step is represented by the implementation of the individual petitioning system, allowing an individual to call for the international law system against his/her own state. See Linklater Andrew. *Critical Theory and World Politics. Citizenship, sovereignty and Humanity*, (Londra: Routledge, 2007), chap.7; Linklater, Andrew. "Cosmopolitan Citizenship", in Isin, Engin F. and Turner Bryan S., ed., *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, (London: Sage Publication 2002);

<sup>41</sup> Kymlicka, Will, *Multicultural Citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 5;

<sup>42</sup> Idem 41, p. 181;

<sup>43</sup> Idem 41, p. 37;

<sup>44</sup> The fact that we would find it hard calling democracy what was so called in Ancient Greece or even one century ago has to do with the manner in which the concept has evolved. However, as democracy grew ever more inclusive, citizenship developed alongside. In time, the concept of citizenship changed aside with the transformation of the manner in which political communities were build and also by virtue of the loosening of the necessary conditions that had to be fulfilled in order to become citizen: starting with Ancient Greece, the Roman Empire and ending with the nation states and the challenges brought upon them by multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism.

the governing process possible<sup>45</sup>, by virtue of the sovereignty derived by the people and for the people, engage two mechanisms that are fundamental, in my opinion, for regulating the democratic construction and, at the same time, the rights and obligations involved with the citizen status: *legitimacy* and *responsibility*. As such, in a democratic regime, even if there is no generally shared vision of the way in which equality, freedom and security may combine, thereby generating the optimal conditions for the citizens, we can speak of an arena for the debate with respect to these aspects and within which consensus can be built. By this consensus the citizens legitimate a form of government, that, in turn, by virtue of this legitimacy, must act responsibly with respect to the mandate by which it has been legitimated. At the same time the citizens, having the possibility to negotiate their contract, must in turn act responsibly with respect to the political community to which they became subjects of by virtue of its legitimacy. Thereby the civil rights and obligations are born.

In this context I find it necessary draw attention on the fact that when I say participation I refer to at least two dimensions of it<sup>46</sup>: a) *active participation*, calling for actual, involved participation by the individuals and groups in the governing process affecting their lives<sup>47</sup>, b) *passive participation*, involving the fact that lack of action is a form of answer or of evaluating the social contract at a given time, a form of acceptance of the status quo<sup>48</sup>. Both participation forms respect the rules of the game<sup>49</sup>, they involve legitimacy, responsibility and accountability.

Correlating the way in which individuals make value judgments with respect to the government, to the way in which they act, Thomas Janoski and Brian Gran advance the following citizen typology, that I personally find very useful to understanding the way in which the negotiation and renegotiation mechanism of the contract between the individuals and the political community in the edification of the rights and obligations, operates: the incorporated citizen- he is part of the elite, or at least feels himself to be, actively supports the party interests, belongs rather to the power than to the opposition, has a great deal of trust in the leaders, operates somewhat selflessly as benefits by the very fact of being part of the political system in power; *the active citizen*- takes part in several political activities, is interested in the other members of his group, at many times he is in conflict with the establishment's elites, may belong to a party or to an organization, he tends to be in the opposition, is to a certain extent radical, reformist, altruist; *the deferential citizen*- non-participative, accepts the authority of the exiting elites, does not internalize the goals of the party or the state, easily manipulable, has the tendency for trusting the leaders as he has the impression that they work at his advantage, leaves political participation at the hands of the elites, but goes to vote and contacts the politicians if he/she needs to; *the cynic citizen*- he/she acts similarly to the active citizen, but does not participate as he completely lacks confidence, is rather passive and very critical; *the marginal citizen*- he/she is detached, alienated with the system due to lack of material resources and power, stressed, votes rarely and

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<sup>45</sup> I refer to the representative government in particular.

<sup>46</sup> Janoski speaks of the *legal status of being*- represented by civil rights that involves a rather passive position, and of the *legal status of doing*- represented by the political rights, entailing a meta-right of creating rights and calling for an active position by the citizen. He also reminds of Hohfeld's classification of rights- freedoms, claims, powers and immunities, situating participation among the powers. For further details see Janoski, Thomas, *Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rihts and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional and Social Democratic Regimes*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 29 – 30;

<sup>47</sup> Starting with an informed and responsible vote and continuing with an active involvement in voluntary activities, ONG activism or various causes, lobbying, protesting etc..

<sup>48</sup> The leaders' actions do not displease me so much as to take steps in this respect and I do not act though I have the necessary instruments to do so to my disposal.

<sup>49</sup> The fact that I do not participate does not place me outside the contract, it only makes me subject to obligations and duties in the negotiation of which I did not want to take part.

stochastically, oriented towards family and friends (the immigrants); *the opportunistic citizen*- makes rational decisions concerning the fulfillment of short term material interests, participates only when being directly interested in doing so, more of a free rider.<sup>50</sup>

The typology above draws attention on an aspect which I find of the outmost importance, namely the symbolical construction of citizenship, more precisely the fact that citizens, in relation to the state, form a personal concept with regard to the rights and obligations they perform<sup>51</sup>. Therefore, the construction of citizenship is at many times symbolical and indirect, citizens being indirectly informed and interested on what is happening within the political sphere, but acting depending on the way in which they personally perceive and interpret the information which they encounter. This symbolic construction of citizenship does not weaken in the very least the responsibility, either of the citizens, or of the members of the government.

The way in which citizenship squares and embodies itself in a set of rights and obligations represents a reflection of the wishes of the members of a community, transmitted through the mechanisms that guarantee their participation in the decision making, more precisely the guarantee of the participation rights. Therefore, three aspects of citizenship- the belonging to a democratic community, the rights and obligations deriving from the membership status and the participation in the political, economic and social processes taking place within the respective community- they combine in various forms to generate the social layout specific to a certain moment.

***The dynamics of the concept of citizenship.*** As resulting from the issues discussed so far, citizenship is a complex, multidimensional concept, that, beyond the theoretical approaches, has a very specific practical finality resulting from the creation of an instrument devised to ensure a good government, on the basis of the participation of the citizens in the decision making process, government that is embodied in the guarantees of the civil, political, social and participation rights and through the promotion of the policies resulting from the contract between the citizens and those in power.

The instrumental quality of citizenship has to do with the fact that “it is not an immutable essence, that we should maintain and pass on. It represents a historical construction”<sup>52</sup>, a product found at the intersection between the various perspectives on human nature, on the types of political communities, and of relationships that can be established between the individuals and the political communities, on the materialization of this relationship in rights and obligations, on the source and nature of legitimacy etc.. Therefore, we can identify, for the moment, at least two practical dimensions of the concept: one derived from the fact that the very comprising elements can take various forms, the second resulting from the establishment of directed relations between these components. Various arrangements thereby emerge, that are best grasped in the main theories of citizenship. At the same time, theories find themselves in a continuous reconstruction process so as to be able to offer the best possible explanation to the way in which the concept of citizenship evolved- therefore they are dynamical as well.

A historical retrospective on the development and edification of citizenship brings out the fact that it is fundamentally bound to the various democratic organizations of the society. Participation is therefore bound with citizenship, it is guaranteed through the civil and political rights and becomes, at the same time, both an internal factor (through rights) and an external one (as the substance of citizenship is subject to the people’s sovereignty principle) that determines the

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<sup>50</sup> Janoski, Thomas and Gran, Brian. „Political Citizenship: Foundations for Rights”, in Isin, Engin F. and Bryan S. Turner, eds., *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, (London: Sage Publication 2002), pp. 39 - 41;

<sup>51</sup> The case of the ritualization of the vote in 19<sup>th</sup> century France in Schnapper, Dominique and Bachelier, Christian *Ce este cetățenia? (What is citizenship?)*, ?, (Iași Polirom: 2001), pp. 97 – 98;

<sup>52</sup> Schnapper, Dominique and Bachelier, Christian. *este cetățenia? (What is citizenship?)*, (Iași Polirom: 2001), p. 95;

dynamics of the construction of the concept. In representative democracies, participation involves, in a sketchy representation, a mere electoral mechanism, but that allows citizens to control the governing process. If the elected govern well, the citizens have the possibility of reiterating their legitimacy with the next elections, granting them their vote anew, while if their government is poor, they loose their capacities along with the elections. Outside the electoral process, the citizens can resort to a multitude of ways to influence decision making: trade unions participating in the negotiations with the government, NGO militating for various causes etc..

As such, we are speaking of efficient, or less efficient governments depending on their actual capacity to guarantee citizens' rights and obligations, capacity dependant on the resources administration, on the extent to which those in power abide by the rules of the democratic game, on the ideology at hand, on the citizens' civic culture and on the way in which they take part in the edification of the government power etc., therefore on a multitude of factors that shape the context in which that political community acts.

**By way of conclusion.**

*What changes?* The following do change: a) individuals- on the one side, with respect to assuming one of the understandings of human nature, on the other, the product of the social construction of the individuals changes, while, last but not least, individuals have an impact on the dynamic of citizenship by the way in which they relate to it in the participation process, and I refer here especially to the symbolic construction of citizenship; b) political communities- they can be more or less effective; c) the nature of the inclusion relationship, more precisely the criteria by which the citizen status is granted and, implicitly, the scope of citizenship; d) rights and obligations- they vary a great deal from one state to the other, precisely because they are the product of a complex of factors depending much on the economical, political, and social context in which they are negotiated; e) the theoretical perspectives- they always face new challenges, such as the new right, the new left, the feminist, multiculturalism, environmentalist, movements, post-modern theories that stress identity, sexuality, life-style etc..

*What causes change?* Citizenship has a mainly instrumental value. By its means the relationships between individuals and a political community are regulated, the purpose being the creation of a good government. A good government is a government by the people and for the people. Therefore, citizenship represents the reflection of a permanent adaptation to new contexts- the passing from the traditional legitimacy of the government to the legal-rational one, the industrialization, the emergence of the state, the recent challenges contesting the organization of the state, the various social movements such as the slave liberation movement, the feminist movement etc..

*How does change take place?* As it is directly bound to the democratic regimes, the reshaping of citizenship takes place by the abidance by the rules of the democratic game, entailing that the people are the owner of sovereignty and, by virtue of this fact, those entitled at most to rule, hence to self-government. The effective enforcement of this principle occurs through representation and direct participation in the civic and political community. As such, the driving force of change consists in safeguarding the participation mechanisms, fact that has major impact both upon the individual (the awareness of the possibility to participate is in itself empowering, while the symbolic edification of citizenship takes the shape of various types of action), and upon society as a whole (participation, be it active or passive, translates into equal rights and obligations for all the citizens).

From a dynamic perspective on citizenship, it becomes evident that it is a regulatory instrument of the relation between individuals and the political community, a relation which is meant to assure a good government or those being sovereign and which are the legitimating agents

of the governing power, for the citizens. In conclusion, a clear identification of the component elements of citizenship that can regulate a stable and solid equilibrium regarding citizen's interests at a given moment it is absolutely necessary in order to provide a better understanding of the historical evolution of citizenship and also in order to enable the researcher to anticipate future transformations of the concept.

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